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Under the supervision of the Operations and Information Management department, 
Victor Castro and I sought to re-create an innovation framework to effectively measure 
quality of innovation in companies. In this paper, we outline the process of creating the 
Innovation Spider Web and testing its effectiveness. Assuming global applicability, I then 
use the web to understand different points of innovation for competing companies in the 
U.S. vs. China that have gained worldwide financial success. Considering the limited 
scope, I’ve set some boundaries. Due to contextual circumstances, the paper focuses 
particularly on companies in the industrial product design landscape from late 1990s to 
today. The 3 case studies outlined look at main comparable competitors with 
headquarters in U.S. and China respectively. These companies are #1 and #2 globally, 
with China leading the way. The purpose of the case studies is to set up for generation of 
hypothesis of the posed question... Is China capable of innovation? Would these 
financially successful Chinese companies have higher innovation ratings than U.S. 
companies? Are there certain dimensions that tend to stand out for these more 
“innovative” companies? These are some of the questions that the paper aims to answer. 
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A. Introduction 
 
Introduction to innovation frameworks  
Existing frameworks for innovation primarily focus on how to identify innovation within 
a firm. Traditionally, a firm can be said to be innovating if it is:	  
● Extending an existing offering to a new customer base or market 
● Introducing a new offering to existing customers 
● Combining these two, putting forth a new offering to a new customer base. 	  
This is commonly represented in a matrix format, often with slightly different axes and 
quadrant definitions. Examples of these depictions can be found below in Appendix A.	  
The initial stages of our research have focused not on identifying innovation, but on 
rating it. We have adapted an existing “Innovation Web” framework to allow for more 
accurate and more standard judgments about the quality of innovation within a firm.	  	  
Redesigned Innovation Web 
The original innovation web sought to not only help identify innovation but also rate it; 
this version, created in 2013, is attached below. Fundamentally, this framework was used 
as a tool to help individuals understand how certain companies excelled in their 
respective industries by mapping out different aspects of the company’s innovation 
strategy. The dimensions utilized a lot of strategic management factors, encompassing the 
touch points relevant to many businesses - ranging from brand offerings to supply chain 
management, involving both customers and internal processes. When attempting to apply 
the “web” to analyze companies, we found that there were various shortcomings in the 
original version, which can be seen below in Appendix B.i	  	  
Shortcomings of Original “Web”	  
 The first issues we discovered in attempting to apply the existing web were with regards 
to the dimensions of innovation. As it stood, the dimensions were not mutually exclusive 
or collectively exhaustive, which created problems both in classifying innovations that fit 
into multiple categories or not into any. Additionally, some of the dimensions were 
highly internal to a firm’s operations and were difficult to evaluate. In order for an 
individual to complete the web sufficiently, he or she would like have had to possess 
intimate knowledge of a firm’s supply chain procurement, the organization of the 
corporate headquarters, or other hard-to-obtain information. 
The next issues stemmed from the ranking rubric itself, initially based on a scale of 1-7. 
The original ranking system identified the highest rating to be equitable to “introducing a 
novel innovation strategy that has substantial customer value and product sales.” Simply 
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because a company introduces a strategy does not necessarily mean that the strategy is 
more innovative. The ranking system identified a score of 7 as the introduction of a novel 
strategy and a score 6 as the creative improvement or application of a strategy. This does 
not necessarily track innovativeness, considering some of the best work has been 
produced by quick followers and copiers. Also, more practically, the number of different 
ratings (7) was simply too high. It is a non-intuitive scale and leaves too little room for 
distinction between the different innovativeness scores. 
Due to these shortcomings, we found that there was no consistency in evaluating 
companies between different surveyors. Additionally, the results could not be utilized to 
evaluate the actual “innovativeness” of a company because the dimensions were not 
necessarily measuring for innovation as we had defined it.	  	  
Redesign Process 
We wanted the dimensions to be indisputable driving forces behind all strategic business 
decisions that outsiders (to the business operation) could identify to be a crucial 
component of the operation of the business. We’ve lumped all internal processes and 
capabilities together into one category, since we’ve identified it to be the hardest and 
least transparent aspect of the company to evaluate but still crucial. 	  
We wanted to ensure that the dimensions where mutually exclusive and collective 
exhaustive in terms of capacities in which firms could innovate while still being 
applicable to diverse set of industries. For example, while platform might be crucial for 
an e-commerce firm, it might not be as crucial for a manufacturing or a product 
development firm. In order to do this, we started with the 4 core competencies of any 
company and expanded from there: product, customer, strategy, and financial. The 
product is the business - it’s what the company sells, whether it’s a physical product or a 
service, the product itself needs to be evaluated. In the case of GoPro vs. Sony, or the 
Nook versus Kindle, there are heated debates about whether the winning product is 
actually superior in product. For both instances, industry analysts argue that superior 
product is not necessary to become a leader in that industry. Customers drive sales, and 
we wanted to capture the importance of the company understanding, identifying, and 
communicating to customers in a new, innovative way. Strategy is the most internal 
aspect of this web and perhaps where there’s more room for subjectivity. 	  
Above all, we wanted to dictate the process of evaluating firms, not just the web itself. 
We had noticed early on, unless you dictate and limit a timeframe at which you’re 
evaluating competitive firms, the ratings could be highly contingent on time. Sony in the 
1990s innovated in a very different than Sony does now. McDonald’s shaped the food 
industry early in its existence, but now smarter, more innovative players such as Chipotle, 
cognizant of the changing landscape, are beating it out.  
In the end, we arrived at a final iteration of the “web” and rating scale, pictured below in 
Appendix C.	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What is effectiveness for an innovation rating framework?	  
What we hope to achieve with our redesign of the web framework is the construction of a 
widely applicable, repeatable, and accurate innovation quality rating system. It is only in 
the creation of such a framework that hypotheses based on this model (or variations of 
this model) are valid. 
In order to test this redesign and ensure its viability, we organized trials of this 
framework by Wharton School undergraduate students. By using students with similar 
academic training and business acumen, providing them with the same information base, 
and using companies whose business processes the students will be largely unfamiliar 
with, we can create a controlled environment for testing.	  
To fulfill these requirements, we chose a sample of Wharton undergraduates and 
provided them each with a short, two-page overview of the innovation efforts of two 
related pairs of firms as well as information about our web, rubric and how to rate 
innovation using them. The chosen pairs of firms were Oracle and SAP and GoPro and 
Sony Action Cameras. The chosen firms are intentionally competitors with disparate 
performance records in recent years. This makes for the most accurate reflection of how 
this framework would be used by professionals or academics: comparisons of firms 
within industries for identification of winners and losers, leaders and followers.	  	  
Results of testing and conclusion	  
The set of charts displaying the results of our testing of 7 students can be found in 
Appendix D. 
The charts show, through a combination of small ranges, similar mean and median 
ratings (with an average difference of 0.39 across all ratings), and relatively small 
average standard deviations (average of 0.94 across all ratings) that the redesigned 
innovation web and descriptions were shown to allow for consistent ratings overall.  
Assuming a common knowledge within firms, this innovation framework is a viable 
option for leadership and management to gain an understanding of their own firm’s 
innovativeness.	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B.	  Context	  Selection	  
My Goals 
The above framework is meant to be widely applicable for businesses across industries 
and business models, fully encompassing the avenues through which a firm may innovate. 
What is not to be ignored, however, is that some of the dimensions of innovation are 
likely more important for certain cultures or contexts. 
Under the assumption that the framework is globally applicable, I hope to set up for 
generation of hypothesis to identify differentiating factors in innovation between the East 
and the West. I will be defining the time frame as late 90s to today for companies with 
headquarters in China vs. the U.S.  
Why China? 
As previously stated, we hoped to create a web framework that extends beyond 
identifying innovation. We wanted the web framework to be an applicable, repeatable, 
and accurate innovation quality rating system. By applying the framework to various case 
studies, we hope to understand different industries, companies, and even context and see 
which dimensions are emphasized and which are crucial for success. 
In 2014, Alibaba’s IPO marked the biggest global IPO in history.1 Despite its huge 
financial success, Alibaba spurred a lot of discussion on why Chia still can’t innovate – 
how it’s perfecting the game of imitation but not innovation. 
China still exhibits an interesting landscape with many institutional and organizational 
bottlenecks (Baark 1987, Baark 1992, Simon 1989, Simon and Goldman 1989, Sun 
2002a, Suttmeier 2002).2 As a result, the context all points to the fact that innovation is 
not possible in China. However, in these pivotal times, China made big strides in forcing 
innovation out of its people, for bringing innovation internally to the country as 
evidenced by institutionalizing “Zhizhu Chuangxin” as a nation wide development 
program. In context of these juxtaposed forces, I’d be interested to see how these 
industrial companies that did achieve global market success map out on the innovation 
quality scaling. This would be under the assumption that our innovation spider web is a 
global scale, meant to capture any companies of different cultural contexts and different 
industries.  
Since the reiterative process of redesigning the innovation web has taught me how 
important it is to outline the time frame and the context of the case study, I will specify 
within the Chinese context. In particular, I will focus on 3 sets of very comparable and 
successful industrial product design and manufacturing companies of the late 90s that are 
headquartered in U.S. vs China. For this case study, I will focus on the baby-stroller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mac, R. (2014, September 22). Alibaba Claims Title For Largest Global IPO Ever with Extra Share Sales. Forbes.	  2	  Sun, Y., & Du, D. (2010). Determinants of Industrial Innovation in China: Evidence from its recent economic census. 
Tehnovation, 30(9-10), 540-550. doi:10.1016	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industry, the computer hardware industry, and the consumer electronics industry. The 
narratives will be the basis for side-by-side comparison ratings, using the web framework.  
Cultural Context 
I wanted to focus particularly in China as the geographical and cultural context in the 
timeframe of late 1990s to today. Why? It was a transitional time in the industrial 
landscape for China because that is precisely when government started to recognize the 
need for technology to advance its economic standing in the global forum. In the 90s, 
governments at all levels in China started to allocate vast amounts of resources into 
invention, innovation, and education with the end goal being to enhance their economic 
competitiveness. As a result, there was a boom of engineers and focus on importing in 
technology sources, but it was done in a rigorous way.3 China is believed largely to be a 
land of “rule-bound rote learners -- a place where R&D is diligently pursued but 
breakthroughs are rare.” The largest criticism is that China, while in pursuit of innovation, 
never set themselves up for innovation -- by investing heavily in engineers and R&D, by 
focusing too much on test-taking and not enough on thinking outside the box.4 However, 
looking at the U.S. many of the successful companies have been founded by engineers 
and the basis of technology advancements came from exponential increase of research 
centers.5  
While the talk of innovation for China came with the 21st century, China made first 
strides in the 90s. In 1994, Dr. Chen Jin referenced to his research on technological led 
innovation in electronic industry in China by coining the term Zizhu Chunagxin, roughly 
translated as "indigenous innovation."6  
In 2006, the president of the people’s republic of China formerly announced its 
"Guidelines for the National Medium- and Long-term Science and Technology 
Development Program (2006-2020)" (The Levin Institute, 2006). In this program, the 
Chinese government has brought up the role of Zizhu Chuangxin again, which has come 
to be translated in many ways (independent innovation, indigenous innovation, internal 
innovation, and self-guided innovation).7 The focus is more or less on identifying and 
nurturing self-guided development and innovation in the science and technology field.   
For developing countries, technology transfers from foreign advanced economies and the 
spillover effects from foreign investment have been considered the most important 
sources of innovation -- since countries lack the capital and the talent to conduct state-of-
the-art research.8 Prior to research, I believed that industrial design and production would 
be the one landscape that China could excel in without ever relying on innovation -- since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Huang, J., & Rozelle, S. (n.d.). Technological change: Rediscovering the engine of productivity growth in China's 
rural economy. Journal of Development Economics, 337-369.	  4	  Abrami, R., & Kirby, W. (2014, March 1). Why China Can't Innovate. Harvard Business Review. 5	  Abrami, R., & Kirby, W. (2014, March 1). 	  6	  Sun, Y., & Du, D. (2010). Determinants of Industrial Innovation in China: Evidence from its recent economic census. 
Tehnovation, 30(9-10), 540-550. doi:10.1016	  7	  Sun, Y., & Du, D. (2010). 	  8	  Sun, Y., & Du, D. (2010)	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market success is highly contingent upon cheap manufacturing processes.9 If even 
necessary, their sources of innovation could then come from elsewhere, from external 
sources. However, a critical study by Yifei Sun and Debin Du in "Determinants of 
Industrial  
Innovation in China" shows that in-house R&D developments played the most critical 
role in China's industrial innovation, beating out technology transfers, spillovers, or 
foreign direct investments. That being said, there are multiple moving parts and complex 
relationships among R&D, technological innovation, and economic development. It's 
hard to say that R&D alone translate directly into innovation or market success. 
One of these so called moving parts at this time was federal direct investment (FDI). 
China became the hotbed of federal direct investments. FDI provides about one-quarter 
of China's industrial employment, 30% of its sales, and 57% of its export in 2004 (China 
State Statistical Bureau, 2005). In 2007, China attracted $74.8 billion and accumulated 
FDI (stock) has reached about $760.2 billion (China State Statistical Bureau, 2008).  
Considering all the moving parts, it would be all the more crucial and interesting to see 
how these companies that achieved global market success may have innovated not just 
beyond foreign investments, technology transfers, but also beyond cheap manufacturing 
and successful R&D processes.  
After selecting very financially successful and globally renowned companies, I am 
hoping to backtrack to understand which dimensions these companies strategically 
decided to excel in, during that transitional time of the 90s when China invested a lot into 
becoming “innovative” in the industrial space. If innovation were to ever exist in China, 
this would be the perfect timeframe and context to look at. I would hypothesize that we’d 
be surprised to see how rigorously innovative -- not just financially successful -- these 
Chinese companies prove to be. I am mostly setting up the case studies to develop 
hypotheses, but I would want to understand:  
1.) If holistically, the ratings skew toward 1-2... reaffirming the widely held belief 
that the concept of "innovation" still has a long way to go in China, and they are 
still midst if imitation.    
2.) More importantly - if different emphasis has been put on the dimensions of 
innovation in China? 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Chen (1994), From Technological Importation to Self-Innovative Learning Mode, Science Research Management, 
Issue 15, No.2, Mar 1994. 	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C. Case Studies 
Using the new web framework as the basis of my analysis, I hope to do case studies on 
the follow companies by looking at:  
·       Overview 
·       Product (Product mix, platform)  
·       Strategy (internal process and capabilities and where to compete)  
·       Customer (brand, customers)  
·       Financial (value capture and presence) 
In my analysis, I look to U.S. – China headquartered companies in the industrial product 
design landscape with 3 specific industries of: juvenile goods, white goods, and computer 
hardware. The 3 competing companies would be  
·       I. Goodbaby vs. Dorel 
·       II. Lenovo vs. Hewlett Packard 
·       III. Haier vs. Whirlpool  
 
I. Goodbaby vs. Dorel  
Goodbaby 
  
Overview 
Goodbaby (GB) changed the global landscape of the juvenile durable goods industry. 
Before it became the international holdings company with 15,000 employees, nine 
manufacturing facilities in China, and design centers around the world, it was first a small 
local manufacturing company. Now, Goodbaby is the largest stroller supplier in the world, 
with its products sold under own-brand or under other company's brand names. It has 
created multiple famous self-owned brands and has also established a long-term strategic 
partnership with internationally renowned durable product brands. Their strength lies in 
product development (research, development, and design), but the company covers all 
grounds. It designs, researches and develops, manufactures, markets and sells strollers, 
children's car safety seats, cribs, bicycles, and tricycles. As it stands, GB has nearly 6,000 
active product patents. In a landscape with little to no brand loyalty, GB has become 
household name for markets in in North America, Europe, and China.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Interim Report 2014. (2015, April 1). Retrieved May 7, 2015.	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It has captured its leading position in the juvenile durable goods industry by eventually 
establishing a solid vertical and horizontal integration of the business. It built a complete 
and prominent brand portfolio, a sales and service network which covers most major 
markets across the globe, an innovative research and development system, technical 
development facilities, and one-stop manufacturing capabilities. It has strategically 
bought out companies to diversify its portfolio with other durable goods companies. 
It all started in 1989 when the chairman of GB international invented the "push and rock" 
stroller and founded the Goodbaby brand. By ‘93, the strollers were ranked number one 
in sales in China. By '96, they had entered the U.S. market and by '96, they had become 
the largest supplier of strollers in North America. After domination in U.S., Europe, and 
China market, GB won series of awards throughout the 2000s for its innovative product 
design. During this 10-year frame, it won 7 Red Dot Design Awards for 4 consecutive 
years.11 
Product (Product mix, platform) 
Product mix: To reiterate, the popularity of GB and its strength lies in its seamless 
production control and supply chain management system. Instead of relying on branding, 
it relies on its physical quality of the product to speak for itself. I could argue that the 
company had focused solely on baby-strollers and making it a superior product, then 
building a business process around it. That being said, while the product itself is superior 
– its product mix isn’t anything out of the ordinary. It provides a wide array of juvenile 
goods at different purchase points and brands, but nothing revolutionary or necessarily 
innovative.  
Platform: Platform dimension is status quo for Goodbaby. 
Strategy (internal process and capabilities and where to compete) 
Internal Process and Capabilities: Now, in its closely monitored management system, GB 
efficiently analyzes and monitors their production capacity, quality control, and 
consistency. GB claims that they distinguish themselves from their competitors with their 
technology skills as well as their efficiency and stable production control. Their supply 
chain management has enabled them to respond faster and more flexibly than their 
competitors to changing market demands - including demands that require them to ramp 
up production on short notice, deliver products in different locations, or modify 
complicated products to suit different needs. Its internal process is really superior to any 
I’ve seen. 
Where to Compete: Its strategy is rooted in insecurity and humility, but the incessant 
need to be different and to do better. Until they listed internationally, they were not sure 
if they were going to succeed… They were keenly aware that if they were 
innovating/competing as an original equipment manufacturing (OEM) company (which is 
what the competitors were doing), they wouldn’t be able to. This sense of concern is their 
drive. The only thing they identified as their edge was this inability to innovate, boldness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Goodbaby Overview. (n.d.). Retrieved May 7, 2015.	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about innovation… It was really easy to innovate because everyone else was content in 
being an OEM company. They identified, ironically enough, that their only advantage is 
this ability to innovate. I say ironic, because that is the singular advantage most 
companies strive for today. In either case, it was really easy to innovate because everyone 
else was content in being an OEM company (E. Keh, personal communication, April 9, 
2015). 
Customers (brand, customers) 
Brand: #3 Again, Goodbaby’s focus had not been on branding but actually creating a 
superior design experience for its customers by focusing on the end-users, despite being a 
manufacturing company. Brand dimension encompasses a lot of attributes of business 
branding: brand management, brand value, etc. Goodbaby’s brand presentation had never 
been its focus but came about organically. Regardless, its value is worth a tremendous 
amount. 
Customer Experience: Goodbaby recognized the need for superior products in the 
Chinese customer base and thereby met an unmet need at the time. OEM companies were 
sticking to their business model of cheap manufacturing processes and delivering low-
priced, efficient products to their customers. It was almost revolutionary in China to have 
focused so much on the end-user as a manufacturing at the time.  
Financials (value capture and presence) 
Value Capture: Value Capture dimension is status quo for Goodbaby. 
Presence: Goodbaby built its design centers around the world to be able to cater to 
different cultural and design needs of specific geographical locations (while still 
maintaining its manufacturing facilities in-house in China). As a result, it’s able to keep 
its prices low but cater very specifically to customers through an innovative point of 
presence. 
  
Dorel 
 
Overview 
Dorel Industries is a Montreal-based company founded in 1987 through a merger 
between Dorel Co. LTD, a juvenile company, and Ridgewood Industries, a ready-to-
assemble (RTA) furniture company. It initially started in Canada, but expanded to the 
U.S.market and also created Dorel U.K. in 1988. It now operates worldwide in 25 
countries and operates in three distinct business segments: Juvenile, Recreational, and 
Home Furnishings. It has annual sales of US $2.4 billion and employs approximately 
6,400 people in facilities. Its management team is entirely based in Canada, but its 
operating locations are worldwide with different centers for the three distinct business 
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segments. It’s well regarded for its successful acquisitions of varying manufacturing 
companies in different parts of the world.12  
Goodbaby was actually a major supplier for Dorel before it became a competitor 
"supplier turned competitor" by purchasing factories and decreasing dependency on third-
party manufacturers. However, unlike Goodbaby, it won its first award for product design 
late in the game in 2014. 
Product (Product mix, platform) 
Product Mix: It is well diversified in its product mix, designing and manufacturing for 3 
distinct industries of Juvenile, Recreational, and Home Furnishings. It helps to minimize 
risk by highly diversifying. However, they mostly operate under the same brand, so the 3 
distinct industries tend to clash for other dimensional business strategies - to be expanded 
upon later on in the case study. 
Platform: Goodbaby’s platform dimension is status quo.  
Strategy (internal process and capabilities and where to compete) 
Internal Process and Capabilities: Within each of the three segments, there are several 
operating divisions or subsidiaries; these are operated independently by a separate group 
of managers. Senior management of these segments manages and maximizes cross selling, 
cross marketing, procurements, and other complementary business operations. 2/3 of 
children and infant products are manufactured in China - including car seats, strollers, 
high chairs, and play yards.13 Idea is to eventually bring all that production in-house at 
the new factories, lowering costs and eventually making it easier to compete in Asia with 
other Chinese manufacturers of children's goods. Production in-house came much later. It 
is only in 2014 that Dorel looked for edge on competitors by taking production in-house. 
During that year, Dorel takes over 3 facilities in China and one in Taiwan -- including 
factories, office spaces, and a R&D center. Past 5 years starting in 2013, Dorel has spent 
on average over $31 million per year on new product development through design and 
product development centers. In order to strengthen its internal process and capabilities it 
made smart acquisitions. They purchased an HK based factories from Lerado group; 
they're very technically quick in responding and they build a good product. Earlier in 
2000, it pushed into heart of central Europe with a Polish company purchase.14  
Where to Compete: It started in North America and continues to rely heavily on North 
America. It wasn’t able to transition smoothly into China, perhaps because its internal 
process and capabilities didn’t allow for it. It relies on successful M&As but its strategy 
in market or customer segmentation would be hardly considered innovative.   
Customer (brand, customers) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Corporate Profile. (n.d.). from http://www.dorel.com/eng/corporate-­‐profile	  13	  Corporate Profile. (n.d.). from http://www.dorel.com/eng/corporate-­‐profile	  14	  Dorel Industries Inc (Dllb. To). (n.d.) Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=DIIb.TO 	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Brand: Brand is strong, but it does give mixed signals. As previously mentioned, it 
operates in 3 very distinct industries but utilizes the same branding for all 3. To advocate 
for “safety” for both home furnishings and juvenile goods is ineffective. That being said, 
by revamping its internal process and by continuing to emphasize its customer experience, 
Dorel could soon replace Goodbaby.  
Customer Experience: Dorel is realizing late on that it needs to focus more heavily on 
improving its product design capabilities. However, it has created superior experience for 
its customers. Permanent Dorel teams in close proximity to major accounts worldwide. 
For example, there are 250 employees in Mainland China and Taiwan, offering both 
divisions and customers a variety of services: quality assurance, supply certification, 
sourcing of materials, and uninterrupted flow of products and freight forwarding. I think 
it benefits from having multiple distribution channels and presence points. 
Financial (value capture and presence) 
Value Capture: Its acquisitions has led to new processes and even new revenue streams, 
but for the most part, Dorel’s value capture dimension is status quo.  
Presence: Well-diversified in the design and manufacturing industries of Juvenile, 
Recreational and home furnishings. It sells through multiple distribution channels, which 
vary by segment - but overall largest customers are retail chains. It operates through: 
department stores, club format outlets, merchant discount chains, independent boutiques 
and juvenile specialty stores. It is also relying on growth in internet retailers by working 
with Amazon and WalMart.  
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II. Lenovo vs. Hewlett Packard 
Lenovo 
Overview 
Lenovo was founded in 1984 in Beijing, China15. The brand itself didn’t come into 
existence until 2004 but it grew in China and Hong Kong to be the largest PC company in 
China prior to then.16 Today, it is a $30 billion electronics company and the world’s 
largest PC vendor. It currently serves the computer hardware and electronics industries. It 
employs 30,000 people and operates in more than 60 countries. Lenovo has been the 
fastest growing major PC Company for 3 consecutive years. It is headquartered in China 
and the U.S., and its current CEO is Yang Yuanqing. Considering it’s operating in a 
fiercely competitive landscape with low product differentiation, Lenovo has been widely 
regarded as a success story. Today, it’s praised for its high quality products at low price 
points, winning more than 100 major design awards and acquiring 6,500 globally 
recognized patents. Thanks to its disciplined approach to geographic expansion, slow and 
steady approach to business diversification, and intense emphasis on internal processes, 
Lenovo will continue to reign.17 While PCs are still its core competency, Lenovo will 
continue to grow its mobile devices and enterprise solutions.  
Product (Product mix, platform) 
Product mix: It is the largest supplier of PC in the world. Lenovo products range from 
tablets, to laptops, desktops, workstations, servers, and ThinkVision. They are 
complemented by extensive assortment of accessories and upgrades. Lenovo designed an 
upgrade for all new Lenovo products as of late called Enhanced Experienced 3 (EE3) to 
boost your PC's efficiency by 40% than a typical Windows 7 computer. 
Platform: Lenovo creates a full range of personal technology, and has since early 2000s 
grown to be the 4th largest smartphone company in the world. They're #3 in the world in 
what IDC calls "Smart Connected Devices," which seamlessly combines PCs, 
smartphones, and tablets. 
 
Strategy (internal process and capabilities and where to compete) 
Internal Process and Capabilities: Lenovo is grounded in low-cost production process and 
50% in-house production in China. They have a “global-local” model – in order to form 
deeper roots into each major market, they invest not only in sales and distribution at those 
countries but also in manufacturing and R&D. From the beginning, it emphasized vertical 
integration by understanding China’s market but also by exhibiting competency in 
mergers and acquisitions, in obtaining patents. Today, Lenovo's end-to-end business 
model with its vertical integration leverage allows seamless product development and 
supply chain operations. It is very unique among PC makers and has become its source of 
competitive advantage. Consequently, it allows them to be more flexible and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Company History. (n.d.). from http://www.lenovo.com/lenovo/US/en/history.html 16	  Our Company. (n.d.). from http://www.lenovo.com/lenovo/us/en/our_company.html	  17	  Sun, L. (2014, October 1). Why Lenovo Continues Crushing HP, Dell, and Apple. Retrieved May 7, 2015.	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innovation.18  
It also operates 46 world-class labs, including research centers all around the world. 
Where to Compete: It recognized India’s rapidly growing smartphone market and 
established themselves there early on, which has been helping their global growth.  
Customers (brand, customers) 
Brand: The Lenovo brand is strong in developing economies, but less so in developed 
economies. It’s practical in brand development. The brand Lenovo came into existence 
only in 2004. In order to handle its growth in range of products, it split its main business 
into two as of 2013. The Lenovo group focuses on computer, mobile internet, and digital 
household businesses, and the Think Group would look after high-end corporate 
customers. This is an attempt to simplify Lenovo's brand strategy. Lenovo helps to 
achieve sales volume while Think focuses on high-end market. The separation is likened 
to the separation of Lexus and Toyota, which has proven to be widely successful. 
Customer Experience: As a manufacturing company, Lenovo doesn’t directly deal with 
consumers. However, it recognized different global needs of consumers when it adapted 
the “global-local” model. Its number one value has been in “serving customers.”19 It does 
so by having its R&D team improve customer experience simultaneously while driving 
down the cost of ownership.  
Financials (value capture and presence) 
Value capture: Lenovo’s business is built not only on product innovation and highly 
efficient global supply chain, but also on strong strategic execution. It knew where to 
position itself at the right time at the right place, and did so without rushing its process.  
Its strategic acquisition of the Think brand from International Business Machines (IBM) 
in 2005 has provided a premium cachet for Lenovo. It also helped them to expand its 
global market share in PCs, smartphones, and media tablets in a crucial time. 
It focuses majority of development on ideas that can be brought to market within 24 
months, recognizing how rapidly changing the landscape of PC can be. However, Lenovo 
complements this with investing in longer-term research, targeting “game changing” 
ideas. Investing in R&D, even in down cycles, has allowed them to be ahead of the curve.  
Presence: Lenovo’s presence dimension is status quo. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Our Company. (n.d.). from http://www.lenovo.com/lenovo/us/en/our_company.html	  19	  Our Company. (n.d.). from http://www.lenovo.com/lenovo/us/en/our_company.html	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Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
Overview 
HP is an American multinational information technology corporation headquartered in 
Palo Alto, California, U.S. Its scope is large - providing hardware, software, and services 
to consumers, small-and-medium sized businesses and large enterprises. For the purposes 
of this case study, I will focus on the sector that competes directly with Lenovo - in the 
hardware and software divisions in the B2C sector from late 90s to today.  
 
Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, electrical engineers from Stanford University, founded 
the company in the garage of Palo Alto in 1939. HP incorporated in 1947 then went 
public in 1957. Its peak was in, again, late 90s to early 200s. It peaked in 2007 to 2013, 
by being the world's leading PC manufacturer. After 2013, however, Lenovo remained 
ranks ahead of HP.20  
 
In the 90s, HP expanded their computer product line to work directly with consumers. 
Previously, they had worked with universities and business users. Later in that decade, 
HP opened hpshopping.com as an independent subsidiary to sell online, direct to 
consumers. In 1999, all of the businesses not related to computers or storage were spun 
off to form Agilent Technologies. The spin-off was the largest IPO in the history of 
Silicon Valley, creating $8 billion company with about 30,000 employees.  
 
Several unsuccessful mergers in 2000 became the downfall of HP. On top of that, in 2011, 
HP concluded that their PC division was too integrated and critical to business operations 
and brought it back. Today, it’s fighting for its position as one of the largest PC suppliers 
in the world in its second position.  
 
Product (Product mix, platform) 
Product Mix: Hewlett-Packard (HP) has diverse range of products, contributing to a good 
product mix. There's nothing innovative about its mix, as it is a pretty traditional mix of 
laptops, tablets, desktops, printers, ink & toners, and monitors. It provides 
complementary accessories, but biggest differentiating factor from Lenovo is its lack of 
smartphones and its presence in tablets is really poor. It's adding a new project, Blended 
Reality, to the product mix which will perhaps discover an unmet customer need, create 
new innovation point of presence, and re-identify revenue streams – should it be done 
well. Blended Reality aims to blend the digital world with the physical world by making 
"technology more tangible and humanized." Some of the projects in the works is Multi 
Jet Fusion, which is a new 3D printer technology and is the most productive highest 
quality 3D printer in the market place. Sprout Workspace allows you to scan images, 
work on projects, create and explore app.21  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Montlake, S. (2013, July 1). Lenovo Shares Jump As PC Shipments Overtake HP. Forbes.	  
21  Introduction to Blended Reality (n.d.). Retrieved from www8.hp.com/blended-reality/overview.html 
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Platform: Its attempt to seamlessly become a hardware and software company by 
imitating Apple’s platform model more or less failed in late 2000s.22 Today, it stands as a 
status quo in terms of computer hardware business models.  
Strategy (Where to compete; internal processes and capabilities) 
Where to Compete: In the transitional time when Lenovo gained grounds, HP had a 
wrong idea of “where to compete.” HP overreacted to the tech shift when the tablets 
arrived and essentially rushed to launch the TouchPad, a webOS tablet at $500-600 that 
went down to $99 within a single month. During that same month, HP spinned off its PC 
business. During this time, it acquired an enterprise software company Autonomy, which 
turned out to be one of the worst acquisitions in recent history. By over-reacting to the 
technological shift, they missed their shares there but also missed the opportunity to enter 
the mobile space. Lenovo stayed firm in the PC market when everyone was shifting away 
from it, innovating very aggressively. It was after then that it made its steady decrease in 
dependency on desktops and laptops and increase in dependency on mobile devices.23 For 
the future, HP's focus seems to be more on providing innovation in core markets in terms 
of cloud, security, and big data. HP believes that the world is "facing a data explosion."24 
HP Labs is currently focused on "The Machine," which is the preemptive solution for this 
future. It hopes to reinvent the fundamental architecture of computers in order to enable a 
leap in performance, efficiency, and security. The problem is, while this is still in the 
works, Lenovo has already introduced certain items in this line.  
Internal Process and Capabilities: Its operations are centralized in U.S. with 37 operation 
sites throughout the states.25 Beyond that, it owns and leases more than 770 sites in 95 
countries worldwide. It continues to emphasize its environmental friendliness of its 
production facilities, which ties back to the brand management well. Rather than supply 
chain management or R&D, its entire hp operations report focuses on its commitment to 
the environment and society. Beyond that, corporate internal process and capabilities 
today does not necessarily allow for creativity.26 Internal “voice of the company” survey 
revealed that employee morale was low, and the employee autonomy process had led to 
that low morale as well as low creativity. Acquisition of more technology related patents 
has allowed it to excel in the recent past, but company acquisitions have been proving to 
be ineffective.27  
Customers (Brand, customers) 
Brand: The strength of its brand has changed a lot since its inception in 1939. I will focus 
on 1989 and onward. Its strength in branding increased with its new, innovative product 
introductions throughout the 90s and early 2000s. In 2009, HP was ranked world’s 11th 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Reisinger, D. (2011, August 22). 10 Reasons Why HP Failed in the Mobile Business. 
23 Sun, L. (2014, October 1). Why Lenovo Continues Crushing HP, Dell, and Apple. Retrieved May 7, 2015. 
24 Welcome to HP Labs. (n.d.), from http://www.hpl.hp.com/ 
25 HP Operations. (n.d.) from www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/media/files/hp_fy11_gcr_hp_operations.pdf 
26 Bandler, J., & Burke, D. (2012, May 8). How Hewlett Pakard lost its way.  
27 SWOT Analysis of HP. (2013, February 16). 
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most valuable brand in BusinessWeek Study.28 For branding, they are under HP for both 
home and for work (for consumers and businesses). It really markets its Corporate Social 
Responsibility otherwise known as "Living Progress," which makes this manufacturing 
company more accessible. Due to a lot of poor business decisions made in late 2000s, it’s 
actually caused a huge decrease in brand value. But overall, as a hardware company, I 
think it’s done a good job of branding itself as very accessible. It missed pivotal business 
decisions that could have helped to shape its brand value and making them significant to 
enterprises as Lenovo had done.29  
Customer Experiene: It has good relations with customers, attributing to its high-ranked 
brand value.  
Financials  (Value Capture and Presence) 
Value Capture: It was quick to abandon where it was effectively exceling in due to 
changes in the tech landscape. Some argue that HP’s downfall could be attributed to its 
decision to stay in the slow hardware market and not making the shift as IBM had. Yet, 
Lenovo’s increase in profit and success during the time of decline shows that hardware 
industry isn’t dead. As previously emphasized, HP reacted too aggressively to the tech 
shift. It left a lot of value to be captured by Lenovo in late 2000s. In its attempt to define 
new revenue streams, HP rushed through the introduction of its tablet and produced 
something that wasn't true to HP's innovative spirit. It ineffectively spinned off its PC 
business only to bring it back a year later. 
Presence: Its presence is relatively status quo.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  100 Best Global Brands. BusinessWeek.com. Retrieved April 28, 2015 	  
29 Reisinger, D. (2011, August 22). 10 Reasons Why HP Failed in the Mobile Business. 	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III. Haier vs. Whirlpool 
Haier 
Overview 
Haier Group is a multinational consumer electronics and home appliances company. It 
was founded in 1984 with its headquarters in Qingdao, China. It designs, develops, 
manufactures, and sells products including air conditioners, mobile homes, computers, 
microwave ovens, washing machines… etc. It is now the leading brand of white goods 
globally, with a 10.2% market share as of 2014. It is considered one of the most valuable 
brands in China. Its development can be grouped into 4 phases. First was from its 
founding days to early 90s, when the company significantly focused only on refrigerators. 
In the 90s, Haifer focused on its diversification and development, by moving away from 
Single-product Company to a manufacturer with multiple product lines. From late 90s to 
the 2000s, it focused on globalizing the company to become what it is today, satisfying 
consumers’ needs worldwide. 
Product (Product mix, platform) 
Product Mix: Haier spent the first 10 years solely on building its company name by 
focusing solely on refrigerators, and it lacked product mixes altogether in early 90s. Now 
it has the largest market share in white goods, otherwise known as “major appliances.” 
Beyond that, it produces for household appliances, communication, IT digital products, 
home furnishings, real estate and bio-pharmaceuticals... essentially becoming a world 
leading life solution provider. 
Platform: Haier has a very interesting entrepreneurial platform for businesses that speaks 
to how innovative this company sought to be. Makers and microenterprises gather on the 
two platofmrs of Qindao Haier and Haier Electronics to innovate and grow the Haier 
ecosystem. 
Strategy (internal process and capabilities and where to compete) 
Internal Process and Capabilities: It focused on an overseas market strategy of localized 
research and development, production, and marketing. Today, Haier has 5 rsearch and 
development centers, 21 industiral parks, and 66 trading companies in 100 countries and 
regions. It has manufacturing bases in each of the continents it is operating in. 
Where to Compete: Haier was slow and steady in its strategy of where to compete. As 
emphasized, it built its brand for the first 10 years by focusing solely on the product 
quality and building a process around that solely in China. By late 90s, Haier strategically 
began its global development with joint-venture contracts that would provide them the 
technology and equipment of European countries. 
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30 
Customers (brand, customers) 
Brand: Its branding is pretty much status quo. It let its items speak for itself. After giving 
that time, Haier was able to develop opportunities for other businesses, which have all 
been financially successful. Because it had grounded its inception in product quality, that 
has become the basis of its branding. Haier is a safe bet.  
Customer Experience: Similar to Goodbaby, Haier recognized this need for superior 
design and product in the refrigerator industry in the 90s. It likewise focused heavily on 
meeting this demand for China, developing its reputation and position as the market 
leader in China. Despite starting as an OEM and not interacting with consumers directly, 
it thought innovatively about what customers wanted in China. Now, it continues to 
complement this customer experience with its internal process and capabilities by 
adopting overseas-localized centers. 
Financials (value capture and presence) 
Value Capture: Haier continues to grow not just organically but inorganically through 
definition and execution of new revenue streams. It is able to do so strategically well 
through its multiple brand points: Casarte, Leader, Goodaymart, AQUA, and Fisher & 
Paykel – but none of this is considered new or especially innovative. However, it 
diversified very successfully out of white goods industry (which Whirlpool either never 
attempted or executed well) into really distinct industries: digital & personal, integrated 
kitchen, real estate, and home appliances. While I want to focus my attention on Haier’s 
home appliances industry performance, I do think it’s provided Haier the growth 
opportunities in that industry by having such a successful value capture dimension as a 
whole. 
Presence: Haier’s presence dimension is status quo. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Haier Strategy (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.haier.net/en/about_haier/haier_strategy/ 	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Whirlpool 
Overview 
Whirlpool Corporation is in the home appliances industry, operating specifically in the 
consumer electronics sector. Whirlpool Corporation is the #1 major appliance 
manufacturer in the world.31 It’s known for producing energy efficient appliances, with 
products ranging form dishwashers, microwaves, refrigeration, vacuum cleaners, air 
treatment products, etc. It’s mean for middle and upper class segments, by pricing it in 
the mid to premium segment. As it stands, it’s world’s largest major appliances maker by 
revenue, but it lost its position as a global leader of major appliances in 2012. It focuses 
on identifying unique consumer insights and designing high-quality products. In the U.S. 
it has been ranked Top 25 Most Reputable U.S. Companies and World’s Most Amired 
Company.32 It has 70 manufacturing and technology research centers around the world in 
more than 170 countries. Its strength is in North America and Latin America, but remains 
a relatively modest player in Asia. Its weakness could be said in having over dependence 
on North American region (half of its net sales in value was derived from this region). By 
only being present in the major appliances sector, Whirpool currently operates on low 
margins and high operation risks. This risk is further heightened by competition with low 
cost Asian manufacturers -- domestic players tend to freeze out foreign brands in China. 
It needs to take advantage of India industry since it’s predicted to grow in consumer 
appliances.  
Product (Product mix, platform) 
Product Mix: It specializes specifically in home appliances, so it’s hard to do a direct 
comparison to Haier. For the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on just the home 
appliances divisions of both companies. Its product mix ranges from laundry appliances 
to refrigerators to dishwashers and compressors.  
Platform: Whirlpool’s platform dimension is status quo.  
Strategy (internal process and capabilities and where to compete) 
Internal Process and Capabilities: It has manufacturing operations in more than a dozen 
countries. It tends to keep its marketing and distribution operations close together.33 It is 
also slow and steady in its innovation, “innovation at the pace of life.”34 While that 
means it’s wise in its decisions, it’s also not adapting to changes fast enough – I’ll expand 
on this in the Presence section. It’s hard to determine whether process itself lends to 
higher quality items, but Whirlpool does create high-end, technically innovative items. It 
is being squeezed of its margins in the process, so it may insinuate that the process and 
capabilities isn’t providing efficiency. Regardless, its final product proves to be 
innovative. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Annual Reports 2014 (n.d.) Retrieved from assets.whirlpoolcorp.cm/wp-content/uploads/WhirlpoolCorporation-
AnnualReports2014-2 
32 Our Company (n.d.) Retrieved from www.whirlpoolcorp.com/our-company/	  
33	  Whirlpool Corp (WHR). (n.d.) Retrieved	  from	  www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=WHR 34	  Our Company (n.d.) Retrieved from www.whirlpoolcorp.com/our-company/ 
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Where to Compete: Status quo. Its global inception was pretty status quo and now 
operates in North America, Latin America, EMEA (Europe, Middle East, and Africa), 
and Asia.35 It should focus on India, but it continues to rely too heavily in North America 
where margins continue to decrease.  
Customers (brand, customers) 
Brand: It’s sold under 19 different names, some of them being Whirlpool, Amana, 
KitchenAid, Maytag, and Roper. Its branding as a home manufacturing goods company is 
a lot about not just its product but about its values – about its history and heritage, its 
employees, community, and focus on excellence and passion. In emphasizing product 
leadership, Whirlpool claims that “their day-to-day connection with their consumers is 
through their appliances.”36 
Customer Experience: It reassures customers through its safety and loyal branding, which 
had not existed prior to Whirlpool in the home goods industry at the time.  
Financials (value capture and presence) 
Value Capture: Despite being a leader for about 50 years, it continues to fall in market 
share throughout the 2000s. It has favorable trade positions, brand name, global operating 
platform, experience executive team. It seems to lack strategy in expanding beyond just 
organic growth – it should try to diversify its product mix more, it should arrange capital, 
it should grow its Asian market, it should make strategic acquisitions. It’s making strides 
toward it presently. In 2014, it acquired Hefei Sanyo, allowing it to quadruple their 
platform in China by bringing increased distribution, new manufacturing and service 
centers, and just reaching more consumers in the market.37   
Presence: Its major customers include retailers Lowe’s, Home Depot, Sears, and Best 
Buy. It needs to motivate its distribution channels better.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Whirlpool Corporation Company Information. (n.d.). Retrieved from www.hoovers.com	  
36 Annual Reports 2014 (n.d.) Retrieved from assets.whirlpoolcorp.cm/wp-content/uploads/WhirlpoolCorporation-
AnnualReports2014-2 
37 Annual Reports 2014 (n.d.) Retrieved from assets.whirlpoolcorp.cm/wp-content/uploads/WhirlpoolCorporation-
AnnualReports2014-2	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D. Shortcomings 
I would like to discuss the shortcomings I had identified in the research process and how 
I hope to improve for the future. Specifying the time frame and the industry was crucial 
for narrowing the scope of the project, and the reasoning behind my timeframe and 
landscape was sound. Investments toward innovation were being poured into the 
industrial landscape at the time, and Sun’s and Du’s study on the critical role of in-house 
R&D seems to reaffirm the “Zizhu Chuangxin” efforts. Organic and internal innovation 
in China may indeed be possible, and the best place to look for that may be in that 
specific time frame. That being said, narrowing the scope has made it difficult to answer 
the initial, much broader question posed: are there differentiating factors in innovation 
between the East and the West?  
Another glaring flaw might be in that I went with the broad assumption of our innovation 
web being globally applicable. It may be that certain dimensions are much more U.S. 
oriented, allowing for unfair judgments of a company’s innovation quality.  
For the purposes of this project, I had focused in on 3 sets of competing companies in 
diverse industries. Professor Robertson, Victor, and I had previously understood the 
importance of providing the same source or summary of the companies to properly do the 
numerical web ratings. As a result, the process for understanding and analyzing the 
company takes an incredibly long time. Additionally, because of its qualitative nature, it 
doesn’t allow for practical replication (which would be necessary in order to get a large 
data set and actually prove my hypothesis).  
E. Conclusion 
I had specifically chosen sets of companies that were #1 and #2 in the industry with the 
Chinese company leading in terms of financial success by a margin. I wanted to 
understand if that difference could be explained by some of these innovation dimensions.  
There was consistency in dimensions that stood out for U.S. companies versus Chinese 
companies – implying that they may be innovating in a specific way that lends these 
Chinese companies more financial success.  
For Chinese companies, there was consistency in high ratings for: “Internal Capabilities 
and Processes,” “Where to Compete,” and “Customer Experience” for the more 
financially successful Chinese companies. Considering I’m looking mostly at 
manufacturing companies (OEMs), it’s pretty intuitive why internal capabilities and 
processes would consistently rank high. That being said, a lot of the U.S. based 
companies didn’t intuitively focus on this. For example, Dorel is only now bringing 
production process in-house in 2014. Hewlett Packard’s internal process has been 
believed to be not conducive to innovative thinking.38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Bandler, J., & Burke, D. (2012, May 8). How Hewlett Pakard lost its way. Retrieved from 
http://fortune.com/2012/05/08/how-hewlett-packard-lost-its-way/ 	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Cheap labor, manufacturing facilities, and understanding of culture gives these Chinese 
companies an edge, but I would argue that these companies’ success goes beyond being a 
good “OEM” company. The glaring difference between the U.S. companies and the 
Chinese companies is that the U.S. tried to focus on all dimensions or too much on the 
external dimensions (such as branding and product mix). While Chinese companies tend 
to let branding happen organically and tend to use branding to emphasize product quality, 
U.S. companies tend to use branding to bring to focus other aspects of the company: its 
values, its corporate social responsibility, its history, its environmental sustainability.  
Beyond Internal Capabilities and Processes, the more financially successful counterparts 
tend to excel in “Where to Compete” and “Customer Experience.” As for Where to 
Compete, it was about identifying new markets or customer segments in a strategic 
manner. The way I’ve defined Customer Experience innovation is the ability to predict 
unmet needs rather than the ability to provide customer service. I actually thought the two 
dimensions of Where to Compete and Customer Experience complemented each other, 
especially for the industrial product design landscape. Innovation came from focusing a 
lot on seamless design of the products.  
Moving forward, I’d be curious to see whether these 3 dimensions continue to hold for 
superior Chinese companies and what kind of strategic implications and correlation there 
may be. Can China innovate? I certainly think so. 
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Appendix D 
SAP 
	  
Oracle 
Respondent Oracle 
Innovation 
- Product 
Mix 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Platform 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Brand 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Customer 
Experience 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Internal 
Process and 
Capabilities 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Where to 
Compete 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Presence 
Oracle 
Innovation 
- Value 
Capture 
1 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 
2 3 4 3 3 5 2 2 2 
3 4 5 3 4 5 4 3 5 
4 4 5 2 2 4 2 1 3 
5 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 
6 4 4 2 3 4 4 4 5 
7 5 3 4 5 4 2 5 3 
Average 3.71 4.14 3.14 3.71 4.43 3.14 3.29 3.86 
Median 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
|AVG-
MEDIAN| 
0.29 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.86 0.71 0.14 
STDEV 0.76 0.69 0.90 1.11 0.53 1.07 1.38 1.21 	  
Respondent SAP 
Innovation 
- Product 
Mix 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Platform 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Brand 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Customer 
Experience 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Internal 
Process and 
Capabilities 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Where to 
Compete 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Presence 
SAP 
Innovation 
- Value 
Capture 
1 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 
2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 
3 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 
4 3 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 
5 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
6 3 1 1 2 4 3 3 2 
7 3 3 4 3 1 4 5 4 
Average 2.86 2.00 2.57 2.14 2.43 2.29 2.86 2.14 
Median 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
|AVG-
MEDIAN| 
0.14 0.00 0.43 0.14 0.43 0.29 0.86 0.14 
STDEV 0.69 0.58 0.98 0.90 0.98 1.11 1.21 1.07 
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GoPro 
Respondent 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Product 
Mix 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Platform 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Brand 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Customer 
Experience 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Internal 
Process and 
Capabilities 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Where to 
Compete 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Presence 
GoPro 
Innovation 
- Value 
Capture 
1 5 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 
2 5 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 
3 4 4 5 3 3 4 5 4 
4 4 2 4 3 1 5 3 3 
5 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 
6 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 
7 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 2 
Average 4.57 3.29 4.57 4.00 3.43 4.29 4.29 3.57 
Median 5.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
|AVG-
MEDIAN| 0.43 0.29 0.43 1.00 0.57 0.29 0.29 0.43 
STDEV 0.53 1.11 0.53 1.29 1.51 0.76 0.76 1.27 	  
Sony Action Camera 
Respondent 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Product 
Mix 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Platform 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Brand 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- 
Customer 
Experience 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Internal 
Process and 
Capabilities 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Where to 
Compete 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Presence 
Sony 
Action 
Camera 
Innovation 
- Value 
Capture 
1 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 
2 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 
3 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 
4 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 
5 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 
6 4 3 3 2 2 4 4 2 
7 3 4 4 4 2 3 1 1 
Average 3.43 2.71 2.43 2.57 2.00 2.29 1.71 1.86 
Median 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
|AVG-
MEDIAN| 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.57 0.00 0.71 0.71 0.14 
STDEV 0.79 0.95 0.98 0.79 0.82 1.25 1.11 0.69 
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